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Abstract 
We evaluate empirically a scheme for 
combining classifiers, known as stacked 
generalization, in the context of anti-spam 
filtering, a novel cost-sensitive application of 
text categorization. Unsolicited commercial e-
mail, or “spam”, floods mailboxes, causing 
frustration, wasting bandwidth, and exposing 
minors to unsuitable content. Using a public 
corpus, we show that stacking can improve the 
efficiency of automatically induced anti-spam 
filters, and that such filters can be used in real-
life applications. 
Introduction 
This paper presents an empirical evaluation of 
stacked generalization, a scheme for combining 
automatically induced classifiers, in the context 
of anti-spam filtering, a novel cost-sensitive 
application of text categorization.  
The increasing popularity and low cost of e-
mail have intrigued direct marketers to flood the 
mailboxes of thousands of users with unsolicited 
messages, advertising anything, from vacations 
to get-rich schemes. These messages, known as 
spam or more formally Unsolicited Commercial 
E-mail, are extremely annoying, as they clutter 
mailboxes, prolong dial-up connections, and 
often expose minors to unsuitable content 
(Cranor & Lamacchia, 1998).  
Legal and simplistic technical counter-
measures, like blacklists and keyword-based 
filters, have had a very limited effect so far.1 The 
success of machine learning techniques in text 
categorization (Sebastiani, 2001) has recently 
led to alternative, learning-based approaches 
(Sahami, et al. 1998; Pantel & Lin, 1998; 
Drucker, et al. 1999). A classifier capable of 
distinguishing between spam and non-spam, 
hereafter legitimate, messages is induced from a 
manually categorized learning collection of 
messages, and is then used to identify incoming 
spam e-mail. Initial results have been promising, 
and experiments are becoming more systematic, 
by exploiting recently introduced benchmark 
corpora, and cost-sensitive evaluation measures 
(Gomez Hidalgo, et al. 2000; Androutsopoulos, 
et al. 2000a, b, c). 
Stacked generalization (Wolpert, 1992), or 
stacking, is an approach for constructing 
classifier ensembles. A classifier ensemble, or  
committee, is a set of classifiers whose 
individual decisions are combined in some way 
to classify new instances (Dietterich, 1997). 
Stacking combines multiple classifiers to induce 
a higher-level classifier with improved 
performance. The latter can be thought of as the 
president of a committee with the ground-level 
classifiers as members. Each unseen incoming 
message is first given to the members; the 
president then decides on the category of the 
                                                     
1 Consult www.cauce.org, spam.abuse.net, and 
www.junkemail.org. 
 message by considering the opinions of the 
members and the message itself.  Ground-level 
classifiers often make different classification 
errors. Hence, a president that has successfully 
learned when to trust each of the members can 
improve overall performance. 
We have experimented with two ground-
level classifiers for which results on a public 
benchmark corpus are available: a Naïve Bayes 
classifier (Androutsopoulos, et al. 2000a, c) and 
a memory-based classifier (Androutsopoulos, et 
al. 2000b; Sakkis, et al. 2001). Using a third, 
memory-based classifier as president, we 
investigated two versions of stacking and two 
different cost-sensitive scenarios. Overall, our 
results indicate that stacking improves the 
performance of the ground-level classifiers, and 
that the performance of the resulting anti-spam 
filter is acceptable for real-life applications.  
Section 1 below presents the benchmark 
corpus and the preprocessing of the messages; 
section 2 introduces cost-sensitive evaluation 
measures; section 3 provides details on the 
stacking approaches that were explored; section 
4 discusses the learning algorithms that were 
employed and the motivation for selecting them; 
section 5 presents our experimental results 
followed by conclusions. 
1 Benchmark corpus and 
preprocessing  
Text categorization has benefited from public 
benchmark corpora. Producing such corpora for 
anti-spam filtering is not straightforward, since 
user mailboxes cannot be made public without 
considering privacy issues. A useful public 
approximation of a user’s mailbox, however, can 
be constructed by mixing spam messages with 
messages extracted from spam-free public 
archives of mailing lists. The corpus that we 
used, Ling-Spam, follows this approach 
(Androutsopoulos, et al. 2000a, b; Sakkis, et al. 
2001). It is a mixture of spam messages and 
messages sent via the Linguist, a moderated list 
about the science and profession of linguistics. 
The corpus consists of 2412 Linguist messages 
and 481 spam messages. 
Spam messages constitute 16.6% of Ling-
Spam, close to the rates reported by Cranor and 
LaMacchia (1998), and Sahami et al. (1998). 
Although the Linguist messages are more topic-
specific than most users’ e-mail, they are less 
standardized than one might expect. For 
example, they contain job postings, software 
availability announcements and even flame-like 
responses. Moreover, recent experiments with an 
encoded user mailbox and a Naïve Bayes (NB) 
classifier (Androutsopoulos, et al. 2000c) 
yielded results similar to those obtained with 
Ling-Spam (Androutsopoulos, et al. 2000a). 
Therefore, experimentation with Ling-Spam can 
provide useful indicative results, at least in a 
preliminary stage. Furthermore, experiments 
with Ling-Spam can be seen as studies of anti-
spam filtering of open unmoderated lists.  
Each message of Ling-Spam was converted 
into a vector nxxxxx ,,,, 321 h

= , where 
nxx ,,1   are the values of attributes 
nXX ,,1 h . Each attribute shows if a particular 
word (e.g. “adult”) occurs in the message. All 
attributes are binary: 1=iX  if the word is 
present; otherwise 0=iX . To avoid treating 
forms of the same word as different attributes, a 
lemmatizer was applied, converting each word 
to its base form. 
To reduce the dimensionality, attribute 
selection was performed. First, words occurring 
in less than 4 messages were discarded. Then, 
the Information Gain (IG) of each candidate 
attribute X  was computed: 
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The attributes with the m highest IG-scores were 
selected, with m corresponding to the best 
configurations of the ground classifiers that have 
been reported for Ling-Spam (Androutsopoulos, 
et al. 2000a; Sakkis, et al. 2001); see Section 4.  
2 Evaluation measures 
Blocking a legitimate message is generally more 
severe an error than accepting a spam message. 
Let SL→  and LS →  denote the two error 
types, respectively, and let us assume that 
SL→  is λ times as costly as LS → .  
Previous research has considered three cost 
scenarios, where λ = 1, 9, or 999 
 (Androutsopoulos, et al. 2000a, b, c; Sakkis, et 
al. 2001).  In the scenario where λ = 999, 
blocked messages are deleted immediately. 
SL→  is taken to be 999 times as costly as 
LS → , since most users would consider losing 
a legitimate message unacceptable. In the 
scenario where λ = 9, blocked messages are 
returned to their senders with a request to resend 
them to an unfiltered address. In this case, 
SL→  is penalized more than LS → , to 
account for the fact that recovering from a 
blocked legitimate message is more costly 
(counting the sender’s extra work) than 
recovering from a spam message that passed the 
filter (deleting it manually). In the third scenario, 
where λ = 1, blocked messages are simply 
flagged as possibly spam. Hence, SL→  is no 
more costly than LS → . Previous experiments 
indicate that the Naïve Bayes ground-classifier 
is unstable when λ = 999 (Androutsopoulos, et 
al. 2000a). Hence, we have considered only the 
cases where λ = 1 or 9.  
Let )(xWL

 and )(xWS

 be the confidence of 
a classifier (member or president) that message 
x  is legitimate and spam, respectively. The 
classifier classifies x  as spam iff:  
λ>
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If )(xWL

 and )(xWS

 are accurate estimates of 
)|( xlegitP   and )|( xspamP  , respectively, the 
criterion above achieves optimal results (Duda 
& Hart, 1973).  
To measure the performance of a filter, 
weighted accuracy (WAcc) and its 
complementary weighted error rate (WErr = 1 –  
WAcc) are used (Androutsopoulos, et al. 2000a, 
b, c; Sakkis, et al. 2001): 
SL
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where ZYN →  is the number of messages in 
category Y  that the filter classified as Z ,  
SLLLL NNN →→ += ,  LSSSS NNN →→ += . 
That is, when a legitimate message is blocked, 
this counts as λ errors; and when it passes the 
filter, this counts as λ successes.  
We consider the case where no filter is 
present as our baseline: legitimate messages are 
never blocked, and spam messages always pass. 
The weighted accuracy of the baseline is: 
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The total cost ratio (TCR) compares the 
performance of a filter to the baseline: 
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Greater TCR values indicate better performance. 
For TCR < 1, not using the filter is better.  
Our evaluation measures also include spam 
recall (SR) and spam precision (SP): 
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SR measures the percentage of spam messages 
that the filter blocks (intuitively, its 
effectiveness), while SP measures how many 
blocked messages are indeed spam (its safety). 
Despite their intuitiveness, comparing different 
filter configurations using SR and SP is difficult: 
each configuration yields a pair of SR and SP 
results; and without a single combining measure, 
like TCR, that incorporates the notion of cost, it 
is difficult to decide which pair is better. 
In all the experiments, stratified 10-fold 
cross-validation was used. That is, Ling-Spam 
was partitioned into 10 equally populated parts, 
maintaining the original spam-legitimate ratio.  
Each experiment was repeated 10 times, each 
time reserving a different part jS  (j = 1, …, 10) 
for testing, and using the remaining 9 parts as 
the training set jL .  
3 Stacking  
In the first version of stacking that we explored 
(Wolpert, 1992), which we call cross-validation 
stacking, the training set of the president was 
prepared using a second-level 3-fold cross-
validation. Each training set jL  was further 
partitioned into three equally populated parts, 
and the training set of the president was 
prepared in three steps. At each step, a different 
part iLS  (i = 1, 2, 3) of jL  was reserved, and 
 the members were trained on the union iLL  of 
the other two parts. Each mxxx ,,1 

=  of 
iLS  was enhanced with the members’ 
confidence )(1 xWS

 and )(2 xWS

 that x  is spam, 
yielding an enhanced 'iLS  with vectors 
)(),(,,,' 211 xWxWxxx SSm



= . At the end of 
the 3-fold cross-validation, the president was 
trained on '''' 321 LSLSLSLj = . It was then 
tested on jS , after retraining the members on 
the entire jL  and enhancing the vectors of jS  
with the predictions of the members.   
The second stacking version that we 
explored, dubbed holdout stacking, is similar to 
Kohavi’s (1995) holdout accuracy estimation. It 
differs from the first version, in two ways: the 
members are not retrained on the entire jL ; and 
each partitioning of jL  into iLL  and iLS  leads 
to a different president, trained on 'iLS , which 
is then tested on the enhanced jS . Hence, there 
are 103×  presidents in a 10-fold experiment, 
while in the first version there are only 10. In 
each case, WAcc is averaged over the presidents, 
and TCR is reported as WErrb over the average 
WErr.    
Holdout stacking is likely to be less effective 
than cross-validation stacking, since its 
classifiers are trained on smaller sets. 
Nonetheless, it requires fewer computations, 
because the members are not retrained. 
Furthermore, during classification the president 
consults the same members that were used to 
prepare its training set. In contrast, in cross-
validation stacking the president is tested using 
members that have received more training than 
those that prepared its training set. Hence, the 
model that the president has acquired, which 
shows when to trust each member, may not 
apply to the members that the president consults 
when classifying incoming messages.   
4 Inducers employed  
As already mentioned, we used a Naïve Bayes 
(NB) and a memory-based learner as members 
of the committee (Mitchell 1997; Aha, et al. 
1991). For the latter, we used TiMBL, an 
implementation of the k-Nearest Neighbor 
algorithm (Daelemans, et al. 2000).  
With NB, the degree of confidence )(xWS
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that x  is spam is:  
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NB assumes that mXX ,,1   are conditionally 
independent given the category (Duda & Hart, 
1973). 
With k-NN, a distance-weighted method is 
used, with a voting function analogous to the 
inverted cube of distance (Dudani 1976). The k 
nearest neighbors ix

 of x  are considered: 
∑
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where )( ixC

 is the category of neighbor ix

, 
),( ji xxd

 is the distance between ix

 and jx

,  
and 1),( 21 =ccδ , if 21 cc = , and 0 otherwise.  
This formula weighs the contribution of each 
neighbor by its distance from the message to be 
classified, and the result is scaled to [0,1]. The 
distance is computed by an attribute-weighted 
function (Wettschereck, et al. 1995), employing 
Information Gain (IG):  
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tIG  is the IG score of tX  (Section 1). 
In Tables 1 and 2, we reproduce the best 
performing configurations of the two learners on 
Ling-Spam (Androutsopoulos, et al. 2000b; 
Sakkis, et al. 2001). These configurations were 
used as members of the committee. 
The same memory-based learner was used as 
the president. However, we experimented with 
several configurations, varying the 
neighborhood size (k) from 1 to 10, and 
 providing the president with the m  best word-
attributes, as in Section 1, with m  ranging from 
50 to 700 by 50. The same attribute- and 
distance-weighting schemes were used for the 
president, as with the ground-level memory-
based learner. 
 
λ m SR  SP ΤCR 
1 100 82.4% 99.0% 5.41 
9 100 77.6% 99.5% 3.82 
 
Λ k m SR  SP ΤCR 
1 8 600 88.6% 97.4% 7.18 
9 2 700 81.9% 98.8% 3.64 
  
λ true 
class 
only one 
fails 
both fail
Legitimate 0.66% 0.08%
Spam 12.27% 8.52%1 
All 2.59% 1.49%
Legitimate 0.33% 0.08%
Spam 19.12% 10.19%9 
All 3.46% 1.76%
 
Our motivation for combining NB with k-NN 
emerged from preliminary results indicating that 
the two ground-level learners make rather 
uncorrelated errors. Table 3 shows the average 
percentages of messages where only one, or both 
ground-level classifiers fail, per cost scenario (λ) 
and message category. The figures are for the 
configurations of Tables 1 and 2. It can be seen 
that the common errors are always fewer than 
the cases where both classifiers fail. Hence, 
there is much space for improved accuracy, if a 
president can learn to select the correct member.   
5 Experimental results 
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the performance of 
the best configurations of the president in our 
experiments, for each cost scenario. Comparing 
the TCR scores in these tables with the 
corresponding scores of Tables 1 and 2 shows 
that stacking improves the performance of the 
overall filter. From the two stacking versions, 
cross-validation stacking is slightly better than 
holdout stacking. It should also be noted that 
stacking was beneficial for most of the 
configurations of the president that we tested, 
i.e. most sub-optimal presidents outperformed 
the best configurations of the members. This is 
encouraging, since the optimum configuration is 
often hard to determine a priori, and may vary 
from one user to the other.   
  
λ k m SR SP ΤCR
1 5 100 91.7% 96.5% 8.44 
9 3 200 84.2% 98.9% 3.98 
 
λ k m SR SP ΤCR
1 7 300 89.6% 98.7% 8.60 
9 3 100 84.8% 98.8% 4.08 
 
There was one interesting exception in the 
positive impact of stacking. The 1-NN and 2-NN 
(k = 1, 2) presidents were substantially worse 
than the other k-NN presidents, often performing 
worse than the ground-level classifiers. We 
witnessed this behavior in both cost scenarios, 
and with most values of m (number of 
attributes). In a “postmortem” analysis, we 
ascertained that most messages misclassified by 
1-NN and 2-NN, but not the other presidents, are 
legitimate, with their nearest neighbor being 
spam. Therefore, the additional errors of 1-NN 
and 2-NN, compared to the other presidents, are 
of the SL→  type. Interestingly, in most of 
Table 2: Best configurations of k-NN per usage
scenario and the corresponding performance. 
Table 1: Best configurations of NB per usage
scenario and the corresponding performance. 
Table 5: Best configurations of cross-validation 
stacking per usage scenario and the 
corresponding performance. 
Table 4: Best configurations of holdout 
stacking per usage scenario and the 
corresponding performance. 
Table 3: Analysis of the common errors of the
best configurations of NB and k-NN per
scenario (λ) and message class. 
 those cases, both members of the committee 
classify the instance correctly, as legitimate. 
This is an indication, that for small values of the 
parameter k the additional two features, i.e., the 
members’ confidence )(1 xWS

 and )(2 xWS

, do 
not enhance but distort the representation of 
instances. As a result, the close neighborhood of 
the unclassified instance is not a legitimate, but a 
spam e-mail. This behavior of the memory-
based classifier is also noted in (Sakkis, et al. 
2001). The suggested solution there was to use a 
larger value for k, combined with a strong 
distance weighting function, such as the one 
presented in section 4. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we adopted a stacked 
generalization approach to anti-spam filtering, 
and evaluated its performance. The 
configuration that we examined combined a 
memory-based and a Naïve Bayes classifier in a 
two-member committee, in which another 
memory-based classifier presided. The 
classifiers that we chose as members of the 
committee have been evaluated individually on 
the same data as in our evaluation, i.e. the Ling-
Spam corpus. The results of these earlier studies 
were used as a basis for comparing the 
performance of our method.  
Our experiments, using two different 
approaches to stacking and two different 
misclassification cost scenarios, show that 
stacking consistently improves the performance 
of anti-spam filtering. This is explained by the 
fact that the two members of the committee 
disagree more often than agreeing in their 
misclassification errors. Thus, the president is 
able to improve the overall performance of the 
filter, by choosing the right member’s decision 
when they disagree. 
The results presented here motivate further 
work in the same direction. In particular, we are 
interested in combining more classifiers, such as 
decision trees (Quinlan, 1993) and support 
vector machines (Drucker, et al. 1999), within 
the stacking framework. A larger variety of 
classifiers is expected to lead the president to 
more informed decisions, resulting in further 
improvement of the filter’s performance. 
Furthermore, we would like to evaluate other 
classifiers in the role of the president. Finally, it 
would be interesting to compare the 
performance of the stacked generalization 
approach to other multi-classifier methods, such 
as boosting (Schapire & Singer, 2000). 
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